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14 December 1961

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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



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14 December 1961


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	the largest oppos	tepublic: The National Civic Usition group, appears to be los	ing some of	
25X1	backbone of the Ument with its lea temperance during failed to achieve	siness and professional people JCN, are showing considerable ders for political mismanagering the UCN-inspired general sits objectives. Student grouping a more pronounced inclination.	e disillusion- nent and in- strike, which s, on the other	
	revolutionary ac	tion, and the extreme leftist-l ch was inactive during the str	ed 14 June	
	gained influence	te opposition groups, however since the beginning of the stri to compete effectively with the	ke, and may	
	tremist leaders These groups, th	if UCN influence continues to one moderate leftist Dominican  O May group,'' are both pro-U	decline. Revolutionary S.	25X1
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Germany probably is aimed primarily at focusing international attention on Soviet allegations of West German militarism and aggressive intentions and at bringing pressure on Denmark to delay implementation of the joint command agreement. Although the Soviet statement warned that Denmark's actions "are complicating the situation of Denmark's neutral neighbors," it does not appear to foreshadow any immediate Soviet moves to revive the demand for military talks with Finland. The assertion, however, that the USSR, in the face of West German and Danish 'war preparations;' will be compelled to "adopt the necessary measures"...to safeguard its own security and that of its allies closely parallels the arguments Moscow used on 30 October in demanding defense consultations with Finland. Repetition of this line probably was intended as a reminder to President Kekkonen of the "watchdog clause" in the communiqué he signed with Khrushchev on 25 November, which expressed Moscow's "hope" that Finland "will attentively follow" developments in Northern Europe and the Baltic and, in case of necessity, suggest "appropriate measures" to the Soviet Government. (Backup, Page 3)

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### CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 29 November through 12 December 1961:

1. During the period under review there have been more threatening implications in Soviet and East German statements and indications of preparations to increase pressure on the Western position in Berlin. We believe, however, that the USSR will not undertake any action which in the Soviet view would imperil the possibility of negotiations, particularly pending the outcome of the consultations among the Western

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powers. Nonetheless this does not exclude harassing tactics designed to emphasize the consequences of a failure to hold East-West negotiations.

- 2. There is evidence that within the next several weeks new controls will be instituted along the Berlin sector boundary. All civilians may be required either to present passports or obtain visas for entry into East Berlin. Without directly denying access to Allied military traffic, the East Germans may attempt to enforce some degree of control designed to face the West with the alternatives of accepting East German regulations or denying themselves access to East Berlin. In this connection, heavy construction at the crossing points to East Berlin seems intended to deter forcible breach of the barriers. In general we believe that the East Germans will continue to maintain a state of tension in Berlin and to move gradually to gain acceptance of the wall as a full-fledged international frontier.
- 3. A new development since 30 November has been the extensive Communist charges that the American troops being rotated to Berlin are not guaranteed free access because they are subordinate to NATO command. This new line appears to be partly for the record to reinforce claims that the "outmoded occupation in West Berlin" aggravates "international tensions." However, slowdowns and delays on technical pretexts appear likely to continue on the autobahn, and temporary restrictions may be instituted. Recent East German charges of sabotage against the West Berlin portion of the S-Bahn installations, and warnings that such action could have serious consequences for Berlin's rail traffic with the outside world, may also presage institution of some new restrictions on rail access.
- 4. The Ulbricht regime continues to be faced with worsening food and consumer-goods shortages, a lack of raw material, fuel, and labor for industry, and unrelieved discontent among

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	indicated at the r press ahead with The regime may of essential commoupled with incr	ricultural workers. Neverthe ecent central committee plent a hard-line political and econ be considering the reintroduct modities in the course of the weases in selective work norm opular discontent.	um that he would nomic program. tion of rationing winter, which,	25X1
	WA	rch committee conclusi	ONS	
		of findings by its Watch Come		
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	tinue their press cluding measures cess and to gain border. Howeve gest that they ex	ere are indications the Commure on the Western position in designed to harass and restracted acceptance of the Berlin wall r, their present military actipated these measures will signary serious military confronta	n Berlin, in- rict Western ac- as an international vity does not sug- ificantly raise	
	activity continues	FNAM: Viet Cong subversive s at a high rate with no markey government forces.		25X1
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#### Political Situation in Dominican Republic

Recent developments are resulting in a shifting in the attitudes of various opposition groups and in the tactics they are considering, and may result in a change in their relative strengths. These developments include the failure of the UCN-inspired general strike to force President Balaguer's resignation, the collapse on 10 December of negotiations between the government and the opposition, and the authoritative political role being played by the military under the leadership of General Rodriguez Echevarria. Political moderates have been outraged at General Rodriguez' role and disillusioned at Balaguer's failure to resist military pressure; civilian members of the cabinet are openly critical of Balaguer's weakness.

Some elements of the UCN are reported planning to break with UCN President Fiallo and set up a rival organization, while others are considering preparations for clandestine activity if the political impasse continues. A labor federation formed last summer with UCN guidance now is seeking to break away from the organization.

A principal beneficiary of public disillusionment with the UCN has been the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD) headed by Juan Bosch. This moderate leftist party has close ties with such reformist Latin American leaders as Venezuelan President Betancourt and ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica. Bosch informed the American consul general on 11 December that the PRD had gained more than 30,000 new adherents since the beginning of the strike and now has a total registration of 101,000. This compares with a peak membership claimed by the UCN of about 250,000 last September. The PRD is the only opposition party which has agreed publicly to participate in the national elections planned by Balaguer next May.

The "30 May group," composed of civilians and military men who were involved in the plot that resulted in Trujillo's

	(/assassination on 30 May, is playing an increasingly significant	
	role as the public becomes aware of the heretofore unsuspected	
	wide extent of the plot. Individuals associated with this group	
25X1	include elements in the military and civilian branches of the	
	government as well as in the opposition. The group, which the	
	American consul general describes as "almost embarrassingly	
	pro-US," appeals to moderates disturbed by the bombast of the	
	UCN and the revolutionary climate its actions tend to stimulate.	
	Leaders of the ''30 May group, '' who provide a valuable point of	
	contact between elements in the mutually antagonistic government-	
	military and opposition groups, are attempting to work out a new	
	solution to the political impasse.	25X1
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#### Danish-Soviet Relations

In view of the Soviet diplomatic offensive in Northern Europe over the past several weeks, the Danes in all likelihood anticipated a strong reaction from Moscow after parliament on 7 December approved the Joint Baltic Command. The Danish Government pressed ahead on the command proposal in the face of opposition within the governing Social Democratic and Radical Liberal parties, and despite Moscow's 30 October note to Finland which singled out the proposed command as one cause of the alleged heightened tension in Northern Europe.

The Soviet charge that this move will "further complicate the positions of Denmark's neutral neighbors" may be an effort to bring public opinion to bear on the government to prevent effective implementation of the joint command. With latent anti-German sentiment a factor, and with the deep concern in both official and public circles concerning the future of Finland and Sweden, the Kampmann government may well hesitate to undertake any further actions at this time which Moscow might use as a pretext to renew pressure on Helsinki and Stockholm. The initial press reaction in Sweden to this latest Soviet note, however, is that the move was not unexpected and that this was Denmark's affair.

A reference in the Soviet note to Denmark's easternmost island of Bornholm repeats charges made over the years by Moscow that Denmark is violating an understanding of 1946 when Soviet occupation troops withdrew from Bornholm and Denmark agreed not to permit foreign troops to be stationed there. The USSR claims that by including Bornholm in one Denmark intends to permit the island to be occupied by for-

of the four subordinate commands of the Joint Baltic Command, eign troops.

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